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Abstract
Mechanisms have become much-discussed, yet there is still no consensus on how to characterise them. 
In this paper, we start with something everyone is agreed on – that mechanisms explain – and 
investigate what constraints this imposes on our metaphysics of mechanisms.  We examine two widely 
shared premises about how to understand mechanistic explanation: (1) that mechanistic explanation 
offers a welcome alternative to traditional laws-based explanation and (2) that there are two senses of 
mechanistic explanation that we call ‘epistemic explanation’ and ‘physical explanation’.  We argue that 
mechanistic explanation requires that mechanisms are both real and local.  We then go on to argue that 
real, local mechanisms require a broadly active metaphysics for mechanisms, such as a capacities 
metaphysics.
1 Introduction
Mechanisms have become much-discussed in the current philosophy literature, to begin 
to match the long-enduring interest in mechanisms in the sciences.  Yet there is still no 
consensus as to the best way to characterise mechanisms.  A brief glance at only three 
major papers attempting to characterise mechanisms illustrates:
Machamer, Darden and Craver: ‘Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.’  (Machamer, 
Darden and Craver 2000 p3.)
Glennan: ‘A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, 
invariant, change-relating generalizations.’ (Glennan 2002 pS344.)
Bechtel and Abrahamsen: ‘A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component 
parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is 
responsible for one or more phenomena.’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 p423.)
In this paper, we will start with one thing everyone – including both philosophers and 
scientists – agrees on about mechanisms: mechanisms explain.  We will investigate what 
constraints this imposes on a metaphysics of mechanisms.  In section 2 we examine two 
important premises about mechanistic explanation shared by many in the mechanisms 
debate: that mechanisms offer a form of explanation distinct from laws-based 
explanation, and that there two senses of explanation, that we call epistemic explanation 
and physical explanation.   In section 3 we argue that both kinds of explanation require 
real mechanisms, and in section 4 we argue that scientific explanation using mechanisms 
requires that mechanisms must be local.  In section 5 we argue that real, local 
mechanisms require what we call a broadly active metaphysics, such as a capacities 
metaphysics, rather than a more passive best-system laws-based metaphysics.  In section 
6 we deal with two possible objections to our view.
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Dialectically, we take our argument to be important because the general trend in 
characterising mechanisms in the literature is to use a more passive metaphysics, which 
our argument shows to be at odds with the basic reasons we examine in section 2 that are 
often given for developing an account of mechanisms at all.  Further, if you think, as 
many do, that mechanistic explanation is causal explanation, then everything argued here 
transfers to this important species of causal explanation.  
2 Mechanistic explanation
There are various views about the nature of mechanistic explanation which are sometimes 
implicit, sometimes explicit in the mechanisms literature.  In this section, we will pick 
out two views which, while not universal, are widely shared by those writing about 
mechanisms.  They are first that mechanistic explanation is a distinct alternative to laws-
based explanation, and secondly that there is something which we will call ‘physical’ 
explanation, where the mechanism in the world produces the phenomenon of interest. 
We agree with both of these deep premises of thinking about mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanation.  We will argue that they impose constraints on a plausible 
metaphysics of mechanisms.
The first view is that mechanistic explanation is a new form of explanation that is distinct 
from traditional laws-based approaches to explanation – and far more promising as an 
account of explanation across much of the sciences.  As Torres writes: ‘The mechanistic 
model of explanation represents an appealing alternative to classical covering-law (CL) 
models’. (Torres forthcoming Section 1.)  There are three independent reasons for this, 
which influence different philosophers in different ways.  All three reasons are important.
The first reason is simple: mechanistic explanation as distinct from law-based 
explanation fits the practice of the special sciences in a way that law-based explanation 
fails quite drastically to do.  And the special sciences now amount to a great deal of 
science.1  They proceed by identifying phenomena requiring explanation, and 
decomposing them.  They look for the parts of the mechanism underlying the 
phenomenon, and start trying to figure out what they do.  They work out how the parts go 
together where, so that what the parts can do in conjunction changes, and ultimately the 
way the organized behaviour of the whole mechanism produces the phenomenon 
becomes clear.  What such scientists do not do is look for laws and try to build up any 
kind of explanation resembling a law-based one.  Bechtel and Abrahamsen are influenced 
by this: ‘The received view of scientific explanation in philosophy (the deductive-
nomological or D-N model) holds that to explain a phenomenon is to subsume it under a 
law … . However, most actual explanations in the life sciences do not appeal to laws in 
the manner specified in the D-N model.’  (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 p421-2.)
1 The special sciences span from chemistry to psychology, economics and social science.  Some areas 
traditionally thought of as physics might still best be thought of as special sciences, as James Ladyman has 
argued in private communication.  He suggests optics, cosmology and solid-state physics.  We don’t mean 
to imply that mechanistic explanation is absent from physics, just that it is ubiquitous in the special 
sciences.
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The second reason for thinking an alternative to traditional laws-based explanation is 
vital is also simple, and has been extensively argued elsewhere.  There are no laws – no 
exceptionless non-accidental generalisations – in the special sciences and no reason to 
suppose there ever will be.2  Those ‘laws’ that do exist in the special sciences are nothing 
more than generalizations backed up by an understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
those laws.3  This is the direction of explanation between laws and mechanisms that many 
scientists adhere to.  It seems to us that a reductive faith that there will ultimately be 
discoverable laws everywhere has been seriously empirically undermined by the huge 
success of science without laws – such as the extraordinary amount now known about the 
detailed mechanisms of protein synthesis – and should be abandoned.  Leuridan mentions 
this reason for preferring mechanistic explanation: ‘If there are no strict laws, there are no 
D-N explanations. Hence the mechanicist alternative, which states that explanation 
involves mechanistic models (i.e. descriptions of mechanisms) instead of strict laws, 
might be very welcome.’ (Leuridan forthcoming Section 1.)
The third reason is that even if fundamental laws were available in the special sciences – 
exceptionless non-accidental generalisations that we could treat as brute nomological 
facts about the universe – it is hard to see how they could explain in the way that 
mechanisms explain.  Brute nomological facts themselves call for explanation, which is 
precisely why scientists do try to explain laws – and they often use mechanisms to try to 
do this.  Glennan (2002) is concerned about this issue, concluding that at least the 
fundamental laws of physics are not mechanically explicable, or explicable at all.  It 
seems to us that this is acceptable if it is assumed that there is a final, fundamental, 
lowest, level of physics.  But so far we have not discovered such a final level, and we 
don’t have empirical reason to believe there must be one.  Mechanisms offer a more 
accurate characterisation of genuine special science explanation.  This reason clearly 
influences Bechtel and Abrahamsen: ‘For present purposes we leave laws in place as 
statements of particularly robust and general phenomena. However, we suggest that 
explanation is to be found in the mechanisms that account for these laws, not in the laws 
themselves.’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 p422, footnote 1.)
So the first view that mechanistic explanation is a promising and much-needed alternative 
to laws-based explanation is widely shared and important.4
The second view is sometimes only implicit in the literature, but it is clearly present.  It is 
the view that there are two different kinds of mechanistic explanation in line with 
Salmon’s more general distinction between epistemic and ‘ontic’ explanation (Salmon 
1998a, 1998b).  The first, epistemic, sense is of explanation as a human practice, aimed at 
2 Cartwright has been very influential here.  She even argues that many of the classic universal laws of 
fundamental physics describe only idealized, closed systems, so are in fact not universal laws when applied 
to the real world.  See Cartwright 1983.
3 Glennan 2002 discusses this extensively.  Note that idealised models are a different issue, quite distinct 
from physical mechanisms – consider that they are models.  See also Mitchell 2007.
4 It is not universal.  We will show later that careful study of Psillos’ views suggests that he believes 
mechanistic explanation collapses to laws-based explanation.  And see Leuridan (forthcoming) for an 
interesting examination of mechanisms and laws-based explanation using Sandra Mitchell’s understanding 
of ‘pragmatic’ laws, which are intended to be available in the special sciences.
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increasing understanding of the world.  It often involves the passing of information 
between human beings.  Although it is aimed at understanding the world, it is highly 
sensitive to the cognitive abilities and background knowledge of human beings.5  The 
second, ontological, sense of explanation, particularly important in the scientific practice 
of explanation using mechanisms, we will call physical explanation.  This second sense 
of explanation is the sense in which mechanisms explain the phenomena they explain by 
being responsible for them.  This happens whether human beings understand what is 
going on or not.6  Knowledge of the mechanisms involved in physical explanation might 
in some cases be beyond our cognitive capacities.  There is certainly no a priori reason to 
be sure we will always be able to know such mechanisms.
The two senses of explanation are naturally intertwined, of course.  If the epistemic sense 
of explanation is to succeed in increasing understanding of the world, rather than merely 
making up interesting stories about it, the stories had better be describing the mechanisms 
in the world.  In the other direction, as soon as we start trying to describe the physical 
mechanism that produces the phenomenon, we begin to abstract, to prioritise salient 
details and so on, so that our description takes on some epistemic features.  But while 
these two senses of explanation are so intertwined that they can be difficult to separate, 
they are not the same.7  This can be clearly seen by realising that they are subject to 
different constraints.  For example, an epistemic mechanistic explanation should be 
perspicuous to its audience, while the correctness of a description of a physical 
mechanism producing a phenomenon does not depend on whether its audience 
understands that description.  A second important difference is that the epistemic sense of 
explanation allows for the imposing of normative desiderata that would be inappropriate 
to apply to physical mechanisms.  For example, one might reasonably attempt to make 
epistemic mechanistic explanations modular – very crudely, organised so that you can 
wiggle one bit of the mechanism without affecting the working of other bits.8  But you 
couldn’t possibly demand that every physical mechanism be modular.  They may be or 
they may not.  These differences exist because in the epistemic sense of explanation it is 
the description of the mechanism that explains, while in the physical sense, the 
mechanism itself does the explaining.
This distinction is implicit in much of the literature on mechanisms, and explicit in some 
papers.  In many papers, an explicit distinction is made between mechanisms as they are 
in the world, and the models, schema or descriptions of mechanisms that we construct to 
5 It is in this sense of explanation that the explanation a biologist gives his small son is very different from 
the one he will give in a research seminar.  It is also the sense in which an explanation which is strictly 
speaking false might often be the best way of explaining something to a particular audience.  One might 
say, for example, ‘Mummy is getting fat because she has a baby in her tummy’.  Strictly speaking Mummy 
is not getting fat, nor is the baby in her stomach.  Thanks to Julia Tanney for suggesting this useful 
example.
6 We will discuss the tricky cases of social and psychological mechanisms in S3 and S4.
7 Achinstein explores the relation between explaining acts and worldly explainers.  See Achinstein 1983.
8 Woodward does this.  His section five is all about modularity, and he writes: ‘The basic idea that I want to 
defend is that the components of a mechanism should be independent in the sense that it should be possible 
in principle to intervene to change or interfere with the behavior of one component without necessarily 
interfering with the behavior of others.’ (Woodward 2002 pS374.)
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explain the phenomena.9  In the construction of models or schema we are involved in an 
explanatory project that is epistemic.  This notion is much explored by Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, among others, and of course has a very important place in science.  But 
Machamer, Darden and Craver, Bechtel and Abrahamsen, and Glennan all recognise the 
deeper relation between mechanisms and phenomena.  The mechanism as it is in the 
world is responsible for the phenomena we observe.  Machamer, Darden and Craver 
phrase it as the mechanism being ‘productive of regular changes’; Glennan says that the 
mechanism ‘produces that behavior’; and Bechtel and Abrahamsen say that mechanisms 
are ‘responsible for one or more phenomena’.  They all mean much the same thing.
Bechtel and Abrahamsen don’t want to call this kind of thing explanation.  We do, 
following both scientific and common practice.  Sometimes a request for explanation is a 
request to identify the responsible portion of the world.  For example, when asking why 
the sun looks larger at the horizon, the requested explainer is something about the world, 
even though it is described in terms of something epistemic – a story about the world.  So 
this physical sense of explanation is a genuine sense of explanation, and it is this physical 
sense of explanation that we are most concerned with in this paper.  It comes in at least 
two varieties – decompositional and etiological.  In the first case, mechanisms explain 
phenomena by being the lower-level entities and activities that are organized to produce 
the higher-level observed phenomena.  In the etiological case, mechanisms explain events 
by being the detailed causal history leading up to these events.  Although a 
decompositional mechanistic explanation for a one-off event could be sought, we will 
focus on the case where mechanisms are the decomposition of a regularly occurring 
phenomenon.  There are interesting relations between these slightly different kinds of 
mechanistic explanation which we do not have space to explore here.10
In conclusion, scientific practice allows for two distinct understandings of mechanistic 
explanation: epistemic, where the description of the mechanism explains, and physical, 
where the mechanism itself explains.  The literature on mechanisms has followed this, 
and the view that physical explanation exists, where the mechanism produces the 
phenomenon of interest, is widely shared.  Similarly, the view that mechanistic 
explanation is a crucial alternative to laws-based explanation is a driving force of the 
mechanisms literature, widely shared in it.
3 Mechanistic explanation requires mechanisms to be real
For now, we put aside the view that mechanistic explanation is distinct from laws-based 
explanation, although it will become crucial to the overall argument again in section 6. 
In this section and the next, we focus on teasing out two implications for the metaphysics 
9 See Glennan 2002, Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000, and Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005.  Craver goes 
on to make the distinction thoroughly explicit.  He talks of explanations as texts, models or representations 
used to convey information.  He goes on: ‘Other times, the term explanation refers to an objective portion 
of the causal structure of the world, to the set of factors that bring about or sustain a phenomenon.’ (Craver 
2007 p27.)
10 See Glennan 2002 and Craver 2007 for interesting discussion.
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of mechanisms arising from the use of mechanisms in explanation: mechanisms must be 
real (S3) and local (S4).
For mechanisms to yield physical explanations, they must be real.  That is, at least some 
of the mechanisms posited by scientists must exist as worldly entities responsible for the 
phenomena we take them to explain.11  This fits scientific practice, matching how 
scientists treat mechanisms in mechanistic explanation.  The mechanism of protein 
synthesis is a system in the world that produces proteins; natural selection is a complex of 
worldly processes that produces the adaptation of a population to its environment.12  It 
also fits the interesting uses to which mechanisms might be put, in causal inference, for 
example.  Leuridan and Weber (forthcoming) suggest that identification of an underlying 
mechanism can be important in addressing the problem of external validity – working out 
whether a causal relation established in one population will apply in another.  If knowing 
the underlying mechanism is to help, it is because you have identified a worldly entity 
that you can with reasonable confidence expect to be present/absent or more or less 
similar in altered circumstances.  Cartwright (2006 and forthcoming) suggests that 
knowing social mechanisms is important to making social policy decisions, which seems 
to make the same assumption.  Physical explanation is the most important kind of 
mechanistic explanation, because epistemic explanation is parasitic upon it.  If epistemic 
explanations are to explain, rather than merely being stories, there must be real 
mechanisms to describe.  So both kinds of mechanistic explanation require real 
mechanisms.
So the mechanisms literature is implicitly or explicitly committed to mechanisms being 
real.  The claim is seldom made so baldly: perhaps it has seemed too obvious to comment 
on.  A more detailed understanding of how mechanisms are real is slightly tricky.  There 
are two problems, which we will take in turn: non-‘physical’ mechanisms, and the 
functional individuation of mechanisms.
The problem of non-‘physical’ mechanisms arises because not all mechanisms are 
completely independent of what people believe of them and how people describe them – 
the existence of social and psychological mechanisms means that that independence 
comes in degrees.  Whatever social and psychological mechanisms are, they are partly 
constituted by people, and some may include the beliefs of people as components.  For 
example, enough people believing that the economy is going into recession, and behaving 
accordingly, might be a necessary step in the economy entering recession.  In terms of 
traditional debates about the existence of the external world, the dependence of such 
mechanisms on minds, their representational or constructed nature, might be thought to 
be an unacceptable mind-dependence of such mechanisms, undermining their reality.
11 The claim that mechanisms are real does not commit us to some variety of physical reductionist thesis. 
We believe there is serious reason to doubt whether science really proceeds by classical reduction.  See for 
example Craver 2007 for an argument that the field of neuroscience has not advanced in ways remotely 
resembling the reductive paradigm.
12 Skipper and Millstein argue that natural selection is not a mechanism – at least not one that fits the 
characterizations of mechanisms offered by MDC and by Glennan.  We disagree.  See our examination of 
natural selection in Illari and Williamson (forthcoming b).
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However, this does not mean that social and psychological mechanisms must be merely 
explanatory schemas or models, thoroughly and essentially dependent on human minds, 
and so forever restricted to merely epistemic explanation.  So long as people, and their 
minds, exist, are part of the ontology of the world, such mechanisms exist and are 
susceptible to scientific investigation.  Such mechanisms are still worldly entities. 
Further, although models and schemas might under some circumstances themselves be 
mechanisms, they cannot themselves be part of the mechanisms that they describe.  This 
view also contrasts with the view that such explanatory posits are merely instruments – 
instruments for making accurate predictions about the behaviour of observables.13  An 
instrumentalist view renders science less explanatory.  There is no commitment to 
anything that can explain why the predictions work.
The second problem for the reality of mechanisms is that mechanisms are at least 
partially functionally individuated.  This is a light sense of ‘function’, where the function 
of a thing is the role it plays in a system.  That role does not require a selective history. 
Mechanisms are conceived of as the mechanism for producing a particular behaviour, 
where the behaviour is identified as a phenomenon of interest by scientists, when 
characteristically producing that behaviour is the role of that mechanism in that system.
This partial functional individuation of mechanisms is clear in scientific practice.  Take 
for example the discussions of the mechanism of protein synthesis in three biochemistry 
textbooks.  The notion of function is ubiquitous: all three texts took the function of 
protein synthesis to be the decoding of the information in DNA to produce proteins, and 
many lower-level mechanisms involved were functionally described.14  For example, 
regulatory mechanisms are understood in terms of ensuring that the right proteins come 
out.  All three texts talk about some kind of repair mechanisms, and they all mean 
mechanisms whose function is to correct various kinds of malfunction.
This kind of functional individuation of mechanisms is also recognised in the 
philosophical literature.  Both Glennan, and Bechtel and Abrahamsen, are explicit that 
mechanisms have functions.  For Bechtel and Abrahamsen a mechanism is a structure 
‘performing a function’ (2005 p423), while for Glennan a mechanism is a mechanism 
‘for a behaviour’ (2002 pS344).  Machamer, Darden and Craver’s characterisation does 
not explicitly make a function an essential aspect of a mechanism, but they don’t 
explicitly rule it out either.  Independent work by Darden and by Craver makes the link 
between a mechanism and its explanandum phenomenon explicit.  (See Darden 2006 and 
Craver 2007.)
The possible problem for the reality of mechanisms is probably clear.  A function is 
required for something to be a mechanism.  But the role something plays in a system 
13 Instrumentalism has a long intellectual history, being traceable to work of Mach and Duhem, among 
others.  See Van Fraassen 1980 for a more recent discussion.
14 See Adams et al. 1992, Voet and Voet 2004, and Whitford 2005.  For example: ‘Uncovering the cellular 
mechanisms resulting in sequential transfer of information from DNA (our genes) to RNA and then to 
protein represents one of major achievements of biochemistry in the 20th century.’  (Whitford 2005 p247.) 
Or consider: ‘How do genes function, that is, how do they direct the synthesis of RNA and proteins, and 
how are they replicated?’ (Voet and Voet 2004 p92.)
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seems to be a matter of description – the description of the system it is in.  The same 
object individuated structurally, such as the heart, can have different functions according 
to the description of the system it is in.  It might have the function of pumping blood 
when considered as part of the circulatory system, or the function of making a thump-
thump noise when considered as part of a system for comforting a newborn baby.  Then 
functions seem to be not wholly in the world, but set by the description of the system. 
This is not a spurious unscientific example.  In scientific practice, the very same thing 
individuated structurally can sometimes have one function, sometimes another – and 
sometimes has no function at all.
Consider an example of this from a discussion of branch migration, the moving of the 
crossover point at which two molecules of DNA exchange excised strands of DNA.  Voet 
and Voet write: ‘such a process moves forward and backward at random and, moreover, 
is blocked by as little as a single mismatched base pair. In E.coli, and most other bacteria, 
branch migration is an ATP-dependent unidirectional process that is mediated by two 
proteins…’  (Voet and Voet 2004 p1189.)  In the context of protein synthesis as having 
the function of decoding DNA to produce proteins, branch migration doesn’t have a 
function.  It just happens, being a nuisance that the cell has to have various mechanisms 
to fix.  That is why it is described as a process here.
The same responsiveness to description occurs for other kinds of mechanisms.  Take 
natural selection.  When it’s the mechanism for adaptation, then it has a function – the 
bringing about of fit between organism and environment – and so is properly described as 
a mechanism.  But when something else is being described and natural selection is just 
something happening in the background, then it doesn’t have a function, and is described 
as a process.  There are many other examples showing that both biochemists and 
evolutionary biologists consistently use ‘mechanism’ to describe only something that has 
a function, using the word ‘process’ when there is no function.  So mechanisms are 
mechanisms for, while processes are just processes in themselves.  Mechanisms, of 
course, are still what is used in explanation because once in the domain of explanation, 
you are thinking in terms of a behaviour or phenomenon to be explained.  Once you 
identify that phenomenon, then you are looking for something that has a function – the 
mechanism that produces that phenomenon, which is thought of as the mechanism for 
that phenomenon.
This looks like a more serious problem for the reality of mechanisms than it really is.  It 
is true that what function a mechanism performs can vary according to our description of 
the system it is in.  But this is because many entities really do belong to more than one 
system.  The heart really does circulate blood, and it really does make a thump-thump 
noise which is comforting to newborns because it is familiar.  When we consider 
different systems we will naturally identify a different role-function for the heart, but this 
is because of the variation between systems, not because of our description of that 
system.  The role an entity plays in any particular system is not a matter of description – 
it is a worldly fact.  Functionally individuated mechanisms are real.
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In conclusion, both scientific practice and much of the philosophical literature on 
mechanisms is committed to real mechanisms, either in physical explanation, or as items 
to be described in epistemic explanation.  That is, mechanisms exist as worldly entities 
that are responsible for the phenomena they produce.  The mechanism itself is different 
from any model, schema or other description or representation of that mechanism, and 
the mechanism itself is real.  Mechanisms are physical explainers, while representations 
of mechanisms are epistemic explainers.  This is the first important constraint on a 
metaphysics of mechanisms.
4 Mechanistic explanation requires mechanisms to be local
The second interesting constraint on a metaphysics of mechanisms comes from a feature 
of the kind of explanation you get when you get a physical mechanistic explanation.  The 
explanation is local to the phenomenon produced.  Mechanistic explanations use parts 
organized to produce the phenomenon, and may also look to containing systems to set the 
phenomenon, but both parts and systems are local to the phenomenon.  This is true of 
scientific practice, and is also reflected in the philosophical literature on the issue.
Mechanisms, recall, are individuated by their explanandum phenomena.  Mechanistic 
explanation begins by identifying a phenomenon, usually a regularly occurring one, to be 
explained.  What then occurs is the process of examining the area local to the 
explanandum phenomenon to see how the phenomenon is produced.  This is how 
characteristic mechanistic explanation proceeds.15  Take protein synthesis as an example. 
Scientists have a phenomenon that they wish to explain – the production of proteins. 
What they want to know about is the underlying mechanisms that produce proteins, and 
the conditions in the cell at the time. So scientists examine the details of the cells where 
proteins are produced.  What is going on when proteins are produced?  What kinds of 
molecules and so on are involved, and what do they do?  They discover that there is a 
stage where DNA is copied, a stage where (various kinds of) RNA are made from DNA, 
and a stage where protein is made from mRNA.  In fact, they discover vastly more 
information than this about all of these stages.  But what they are doing certainly involves 
decomposing into local parts, and investigation of the local cell conditions.  They look for 
the lower level stuff that produces the higher-level stuff, and the conditions under which 
this happens.  In this sense, a great deal of what is described at great length in 
biochemistry textbooks just is protein synthesis.
Precisely because of the functional individuation of mechanisms, the extent of the 
locality you expect in a mechanism is set by the phenomenon the mechanism produces. 
Protein synthesis is very constrained, happening within a single cell.  This is where the 
proteins appear, and where we look for the mechanisms that produce them.  Compare 
15 This understanding of decompositional mechanistic explanation is uncontroversial in the mechanisms 
literature.  See for example Bechtel and Abrahamsen: ‘The quest to understand the mechanism responsible 
for a given phenomenon requires decomposing the responsible system.’ (2008 p560.) They also discuss the 
importance of looking upwards to higher-level mechanisms.  For this paper, we set aside etiological 
mechanistic explanation.  We suspect that it will exhibit the same kind of locality as decompositional 
mechanistic explanation, but lack space to establish that here.
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natural selection, which happens within entire populations – much larger entities than 
single cells.  Nevertheless, if you are interested in how natural selection has produced a 
particular distribution of trait types in a population, you study the history of the 
happenings in that population.  You will also have to study the environment of that 
population, but that is also local – you don’t look anywhere else.  Investigating social 
mechanisms might lead you to look at social relations in an entire country, or even 
internationally.  Investigating emission mechanisms for gravitational waves would lead 
you to look at something much bigger – the behaviour of binary pulsars, or even the 
movement of entire galaxies.  But in each case the phenomenon sets the extent of 
appropriate locality.  It isn’t that mechanisms are always the size of 200 molecules, or 
three galaxies, it is that they are constrained in locality by where the phenomenon is that 
they are thought to produce.  Other regions of space are not investigated, since they are 
not considered relevant.
Locality is implicit in much philosophical discussion of mechanisms, and explicit in 
some cases.  Although he doesn’t use the word ‘locality’, Craver, for example, gives the 
matter some extended discussion.  Craver thinks that mechanisms are generally 
hierarchically nested, and mechanisms at different levels fall in (certain sorts of) part-
whole relations.  He writes ‘The primary difference is that LM levels [levels in the 
multilevel mechanism for spatial memory] are relationships between a whole and its 
parts, while levels of processing are relationships between distinct items.’  (See Craver 
2007 p178.)  Clearly, parts of wholes are local to those wholes, so Craver thinks that 
lower-level mechanisms are local to higher-level ones.
Craver also examines the issue of what, in the local area of the explanandum 
phenomenon, might be left out of the mechanism for the phenomenon.  Not everything 
local is relevant.  Writing again of his spatial memory case study, he claims: 
‘Components at lower levels are organized to make up the behaviours at higher levels, 
and lower- and higher-level items stand in relationships of mutual manipulability…’ 
(See Craver 2007 p170.)  By mutual manipulability, he means, very crudely, that if you 
wiggle one, the other wiggles, and vice versa.  Not all parts of the cell, for example, are 
components of the mechanism of protein synthesis in this sense.  And this is generally 
true of mechanistic explanation.  If you are investigating social relationships the 
behaviour of the atoms or molecules of people are irrelevant, and a star collapsing will 
emit gravitational waves quite independently of the behaviour of any nearby life.  While 
this shows that not everything that is local will be part of the mechanism, it is true that 
the parts of the mechanism will be local to where the phenomenon they produce exists. 
Mechanisms come in different sizes because the phenomena they produce come in 
different sizes.  The extent of mechanisms that produce various phenomena is part of 
what is learned by scientists as the mechanisms for the phenomena are better understood. 
One of the things that is surprising about various subatomic phenomena in physics, for 
example, is how non-local their causes and effects might be.16  Nevertheless scientists in 
different fields come to have a good idea of how dispersed the mechanisms they are 
looking for are likely to be.  Once that is established, they do not look further afield.  It is, 
16 In this way, quantum non-locality isn’t a counterexample to our locality claim, since quantum 
phenomena are still local to the system.  What’s surprising is how spread out in space that system can be.
10
if you like, an empirical discovery of any mechanism what extent of local space-time is 
relevant to the explanation.  In all cases, that locality is limited.
Our discussion of the locality of mechanisms sails confusingly close to debates elsewhere 
in philosophy.  It is worth pausing to make clear that the locality claim is a claim about 
mechanistic explanation in scientific practice and how it is understood in the mechanisms 
literature.  We are not here concerned with metaphysical debates about causality, such as 
the claim that causal relations are intrinsic.17  The locality of mechanisms might imply 
that a precise copy of a mechanism is still a mechanism, which is an interesting parallel 
of some ways of understanding the intrinsicality claim.  But this debate is not what 
concerns us here.  We are also not concerned with alternative scientific claims about 
locality.  A familiar locality claim from physics is that there can be no covariation of 
physical properties that are spacetime separated, where the covariation would demand 
that the propagation of any causal influence would have to be faster than the speed of 
light.  This might be recast in less scientific terms as a doctrine of no action at a distance, 
which confusingly enough seems to be what some philosophers mean by locality when 
they talk about causality.18  If these are basic laws of physics, then no doubt mechanisms 
will not violate them.  But such laws require support from physics more generally – 
examining how mechanisms are used in explanation cannot establish that nothing moves 
faster than the speed of light!  Since we are looking for a claim supported by the use of 
mechanisms in explanation, it should be clear that this is not the locality claim we have in 
mind.
To reiterate, the claim is that in decompositional mechanistic explanation, the mechanism 
that produces the phenomenon of interest is looked for and discovered in the area of the 
phenomenon produced.  This makes perfect sense of the idea that the mechanisms 
discovered are the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon.  Other regions of space and 
time are not considered relevant.
Before ending this section, we will raise three possible problems for the locality of 
mechanisms: the functional individuation of mechanisms, the existence of non-‘physical’ 
mechanisms, and omissions.  We will argue that none puts paid to locality, although 
examining them does yield a better grasp of the locality claim.
The first problem is that mechanisms having functions potentially damages the locality of 
a mechanism.  If functions are relative to a description of a system, and that description, 
along with the wider system, is not part of the world where the mechanism is, then 
mechanisms are not wholly local.  However, just as for the reality of mechanisms, this 
problem can be resolved by recognising that functions are more accurately thought of as 
objective, worldly relations between a mechanism and the (perhaps several) different 
systems it is in.  Consider the heart again, as structurally individuated.  Its role as blood-
circulator is set by the higher-level system of blood circulation it is a part of, while its 
17 Ned Hall characterises this informally: ‘Intrinsicness: The causal structure of a process is determined by 
its intrinsic, non-causal character (together with the laws).’  (Hall 2004 p225.)
18 Ned Hall, for example, uses the following sense of locality: ‘Locality: Causes are connected to their 
effects via spatiotemporally continuous sequences of causal intermediates.’ (Hall 2004 p225.)
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role of baby-comforter is set by that different system.  But this is not a matter of 
description, just a relation between the heart and two different (and local) systems it 
really is a part of.  This is not a serious problem for locality any more than it is for reality.
Again, the possibility of non-‘physical’ mechanisms requires careful thought.  We have 
pointed out already that locality is always relative to the phenomenon explained, so that 
some non-‘physical’ mechanisms, such as social mechanisms, might be very large 
indeed.  But it is also true that how thoroughgoing the locality is, how deeply it extends, 
varies from mechanism to mechanism, affecting effective strategies of decomposition.
Craver recognises this: ‘Localization is one of the most fundamental spatial constraints 
on interlevel integration (Bechtel and Richardson 1993).  Not all mechanisms have easily 
localized components, but when they do, the location of different processes can be crucial 
to understanding a mechanism that incorporates them.’  (Craver 2007 p261-2.)  This is a 
particularly interesting issue for psychological mechanisms, where there is great debate 
on localization strategies.  There is disagreement, for example, on whether specific 
psychological functions are localized to particular parts of the brain, or processed in a 
way far more dispersed through the brain.19  Nevertheless, this becomes an issue once the 
description of the phenomenon is underway, which is once the locality of the mechanism 
is already set.  In these cases, both sides of the debate still agree that the mechanisms 
producing psychological phenomena are in the brain.  That is local enough.
There is a far trickier problem case.20  Some decompositional psychological mechanisms 
cite content-bearing mental states as part of the mechanism.  For example, the behaviour 
of a rat in a maze might routinely require explanation in terms of false beliefs about 
where food is – where of course the content of the false belief is crucial to the 
explanation.  If mental content is external, depending on the history of the interaction of 
the organism with its environment, then this particular decompositional mechanism is not 
local.  The phenomenon may arise in the brain, but some of its constituents are elsewhere.
This is of course a controversial case.  It seems to us there are three options.  The first is 
to say that psychological mechanisms are just quite different from other mechanisms in 
this way.  This is a position one might be driven to, but is ad hoc as a first move.  The 
second option is a denial of externalism about content.  All that is necessary for 
mechanisms is the narrow content of any content-bearing mental state, which supervenes 
only on the local brain state.  Our third option is to take externalism about content more 
seriously – perhaps as seriously as the extended mind thesis does.  Then, we re-construe 
the appropriate extent of mental phenomena, so that external items are appropriate parts 
for decomposition of mental events.21  These are interesting issues worthy of wider 
consideration, but we lack space to develop them here.  We have said enough to indicate 
the defence of our locality thesis, because on either the second or the third story, the case 
doesn’t violate locality.
19 See the debate about core realizers.  Advocates include Block 2005 and Wilson 2004.  These are very 
interesting issues we intend to examine at length elsewhere.
20 Thanks to Anthony Everett for raising this point.
21 See the forthcoming Menary collection for extensive discussion of the extended mind thesis.
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The third problem is difficult.  The problem is that if omissions are part of any 
mechanism, which they routinely seem to be, then that mechanism will not be local.  The 
mechanism might depend on features thoroughly non-local to the phenomenon it 
produces – perhaps on features that have no location at all.  The problem of locating 
omissions is well known from the vast literature on omissions and causation.22  To 
illustrate, suppose I, your neighbour, promise to water your plants when you are on 
holiday.  I don’t, and they die.23  It seems my omitting to water the plants causes their 
death.  But where is my omission located?  Is it in your house where I fail to turn up?  Or 
is it wherever I am, busy not watering plants?  There seems to be no satisfactory answer. 
Yet it is not impossible that omissions are routinely part of some mechanisms.  In the 
context of causation, Schaffer discusses the example of a gunshot through the heart 
causing death, but it isn’t difficult to see the circulatory system and the internal workings 
of a gun that he describes as mechanisms.  Schaffer writes: ‘But heart damage only 
causes death by negative causation: heart damage (c) causes an absence of oxygenated 
blood flow to the brain (~d), which causes the cells to starve (e).’  Later he considers the 
gun: ‘But trigger pullings only cause bullet firings by negative causation: pulling the 
trigger (c) causes the removal of the sear from the path of the spring (~d), which causes 
the spring to uncoil, thereby compressing the gunpowder and causing an explosion, 
which causes the bullet to fire (e).’ (Schaffer 2004 p199.)  Examples in biochemistry are 
numerous.  Cells routinely alter which enzymes they produce in response to which 
metabolites are available.  A cell stops producing lactase, for example, in response to the 
absence of lactose diffusing into the cell’s cytoplasm.
Our view is that omissions are not a problem for the locality of mechanisms in the same 
way that they are for causation.  Causal relations are often subject to absences.  Just as 
my failure to water your plants caused their death, so the Queen’s failure to water them 
caused their death, and so on.  There is no location for these omissions.  But the kinds of 
omissions that are routinely part of mechanisms are locatable, and they are local.  This is 
clear in all three examples above.  The deoxygenated blood is part of the circulatory 
system within the body; the removal of the sear from the path of the spring is part of the 
gun mechanism, and the alteration of gene expression within the cell is in response to 
differing levels of metabolites within that cell.  All of these are in the familiar area where 
we would attempt a decomposition of the relevant phenomena.
Causation and mechanisms are different here because difference-making is important to 
causation and not to mechanisms.  Often, the conviction that difference-making is crucial 
to causation is decisive on thinking that absences cause.  This is because in the causation 
case an absence often stands in a difference-making relation to the effect.  To illustrate, it 
is missing the bus that made the difference to my lateness, not the empty bus-stop when I 
got there.24  That is why it is the absence that causes my lateness, rather than the positive 
story about where the missing bus actually is.  This idea of difference-making is plausibly 
22 See for example Schaffer 2004 and Dowe 2004 for an interesting symposium.
23 This useful example is originally Helen Beebee’s.  See for example her 2004.
24 We take this important point to be a central view of David Lewis’ later work.  See Lewis 2004.  For 
further discussion of the idea of difference-making and its relation to causation, see Hall 2004.  Difference-
making itself might be tracked in different ways, such as using simple counterfactual notions, invariance 
relations, or correlations.
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very important to causation, but it isn’t central to a mechanism.  So such external 
omissions are not in the same way relevant to mechanisms, being outside the relevant 
mechanisms.  This means that only local omissions are relevant to mechanisms.
In conclusion, and in spite of some challenging problems, it is a genuine feature of 
mechanisms that they are local.  This is a kind of locality that scientific practice is 
committed to in how it explains using real mechanisms, and a locality that is, albeit 
sometimes implicitly, reflected widely in the mechanisms literature.  This is the second 
important constraint on a metaphysics of mechanisms.  Mechanisms are both real and 
really there, and the right metaphysics of mechanisms must respect that.
5 Reality and Locality require an active metaphysics
The problem for a good metaphysics of mechanisms is to characterise the interactions in 
mechanisms.  Recall that all characterisations of mechanisms have two components, with 
something about the parts of mechanisms, and something about how the parts interact. 
The metaphysics of the parts of mechanisms has been uncontroversial.  They have had 
different names – ‘entities’, ‘parts’ and ‘component parts’ in the characterizations above 
– but they have not been much discussed.  What is controversial is how to characterize 
what the parts of mechanisms do, the activities or interactions of the parts.  It is not 
surprising that this is controversial, since the interactions are more interesting 
metaphysically.  Unlike the parts, or entities, which are actual, understanding 
mechanisms also involves understanding what those entities will do in non-actual 
situations.  Scientists seem to know of many mechanisms what they would do when the 
initial conditions are changed in various ways.
It is in characterising the interactions of parts of mechanisms that the reality and locality 
of mechanisms becomes relevant, because not all metaphysical approaches to the 
interactions allow mechanisms to be real and local.  Understanding the metaphysics of 
mechanisms on this level is now a philosophical problem with no immediate bearing on 
scientific method, of course.  It does, however, bear on our understanding of science. 
Since both scientific practice and many philosophical treatments of mechanisms are 
committed to their locality and reality, our argument should be of wide interest.
There are broadly two approaches to characterising the interactions in mechanisms, and 
we will argue that all the approaches to metaphysics that allow mechanisms to be real and 
local lie within only one of these approaches.  We call these broad approaches ‘passive’ 
and ‘active’.  Passive approaches characterise interactions using laws or some 
counterfactual notion or other – either relatively simple counterfactuals, or their more 
sophisticated cousin the invariance relation.  They then use either a best-system laws 
grounding for such counterfactual claims, or a modally realist grounding.25  We call this 
25 These familiar ideas derive from Ramsey, through significant development by David Lewis.  Ramsey 
discusses the possibility of us systematising our knowledge in a deductive system, suggesting that the laws 
are the axioms of such a system.  See Ramsey 1990 p143.  We focus on the best-system laws grounding for 
counterfactuals as it is Stathis Psillos’ explicit view (see Psillos 2004), and include modal realism as the 
major alternative.
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approach ‘passive’ because broadly the grounding for counterfactual claims is just 
patterns of the objects in this or in other worlds.  
Passive approaches contrast with active approaches.  These latter approaches give an 
account of interactions in terms of the capacities, powers or activities of entities.  So 
active approaches include Machamer, Darden and Craver’s activities approach, where 
activities are varied things that entities can engage in, like bonding, breaking, pushing 
and coiling.  Also included are Nancy Cartwright’s capacities approach, which claims 
that capacities are properties of objects, and Carl Gillett’s powers approach, which 
follows Shoemaker in individuating properties by their causal powers, so that having a 
property implies action in certain conditions.26  We will argue that only active approaches 
give a local characterization of a mechanism.
We take the points we make about the metaphysical systems to be well-understood 
aspects of these systems.  They also have well-known problems, which we shall not 
repeat here.  Nevertheless the significance of these points for thinking about the 
metaphysics of mechanisms needs to be spelled out.  Dialectically, this is interesting to 
the mechanisms literature because – outside of traditional metaphysics – passive 
approaches are generally regarded as metaphysically less problematic than active 
approaches.  This yields a dialectical reason for philosophers working on philosophy of 
science, but not inclined to do traditional metaphysics, to plump for passive 
characterisations of interactions in mechanisms.  In the core mechanisms literature, only 
Machamer, Darden and Craver are trying to use an active approach to characterise 
interactions in mechanisms, but the novelty and apparent extremity of their approach is 
off-putting to many.  Recent work by Gillett using a powers approach is interesting too, 
but has yet to be picked up extensively in the mechanisms literature.  We wish to oppose 
this dialectical trend towards passive approaches by pointing out that there are well-
worked-out metaphysical systems available that do a better job for mechanisms than 
passive approaches.
Using some counterfactual account or other of the interactions in a mechanism has been 
popular.  This is the approach of Woodward, Psillos and later Glennan.  We will raise 
concerns about the status of this claim later on, but suppose for now that it is a claim 
about the nature of mechanisms.  Whether such a view yields real, local mechanisms or 
not depends on what you take to ground counterfactuals.  Take the passive views first. 
Suppose the truth-conditions for counterfactuals – whether simple or sophisticated – are 
grounded in a best-system account of laws of nature, where the best-system is judged by 
the simplicity and strength of laws.27  If this is so, then mechanisms are not local. 
Mechanisms depend on two kinds of non-local features.  The first is features of many 
other places and times in this world, those necessary to determine the laws of nature.  As 
26 See Cartwright 1989, Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000 and Gillett 2006.  There is considerable 
variation within the active tradition, with Machamer, Darden and Craver’s essentially dynamic activities 
the most ‘active’.  We will come to some of these distinctions later.
27 This is Psillos’ view.  He writes: ‘The one [story] I favor ties the truth-conditions of counterfactual 
assertions to laws of nature.’  He adds later: ‘Laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent 
system of regularities, in particular, a system which can be represented as an ideal deductive axiomatic 
system striking a good balance between simplicity and strength.’ (Both from Psillos 2004 p299.)
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we have said in the previous section, this is in tension with the actual practice of 
mechanistic explanation in the sciences, which examines only local regions of spacetime 
in constructing mechanistic explanations.  The second kind of feature is the simplicity 
and strength of laws that establish what is the best system of laws.  No such features are 
local, being dependent first on the entire universe, and second on the abstract concepts 
simplicity and strength, which cannot be located clearly at all.  Such mechanisms might 
also fail to be real – depending on the status of laws.  In general, an anti-realist account of 
laws clearly yields non-real mechanisms; while any passive realist account of laws still 
has truthmakers widespread in the universe for law, so mechanisms based on such laws 
will be non-local.28
Take the alternative modal realist account of truthmakers for counterfactuals, where the 
truth of any counterfactual claim depends on what happens to counterparts in nearby 
possible worlds.29  Mechanisms involving such counterfactuals might well be real.  But 
the situation regarding locality is worsened.  This view makes the truth of counterfactual 
claims depend not only on what happens elsewhere in this world, but also on what 
happens in nearby possible worlds.  This is the most radically non-local account of the 
interactions in mechanisms it is possible to have.  In general, any passive metaphysical 
grounding for such counterfactual claims as part of mechanisms will yield non-local, and 
in some cases also non-real, mechanisms.30
The only prospect for a real and local metaphysics is some variety of active metaphysics, 
a metaphysics such as Machamer, Darden and Craver’s activities, or Cartwright’s 
capacities.  We begin here with Cartwright’s capacities view, since it is a more familiar 
real and local metaphysics.  We will raise the issue of how far our arguments transfer to 
other active approaches later.  
On the capacities approach, the interactions between parts of a mechanism are described 
in terms of the capacities of the entities in the mechanism.  Cartwright holds that most 
general causal claims such as ‘aspirins relieve headaches’ or ‘electromagnetic forces 
cause motions perpendicular to the line of action’, are really ascriptions of capacities – 
the capacity to relieve headaches ascribed to aspirin, and the capacity to cause motions 
perpendicular to the line of action ascribed to electromagnetic forces.  Capacities are 
28 David Lewis seems committed to this, since he accepts the parallel implication for a laws-based account 
of causation: ‘Like any regularity theory, the best-system analysis says that laws hold in virtue of patterns 
spread over all of space and time. If laws underlie causation, that means that we are wrong if we think, for 
instance, that the causal roles of my brain states here and now are an entirely local matter. That's an 
unpleasant surprise, but I'm prepared to bite the bullet.’ (Lewis 1994 p479.)  Note that if the best-system 
view of laws is as a best system in a world consisting of four-dimensional spacetime, then mechanisms 
today will also depend on the future.
29 No one in the mechanisms literature explicitly holds this view, to our knowledge.  However, given the 
history of metaphysical theorising about counterfactuals, it is too important an alternative to neglect.
30 We do not discuss Woodward’s test-conditions for the truth of counterfactuals because Woodward claims 
that his view is not a metaphysical one.  See Woodward 2003.  Nevertheless, if you did take Woodward’s 
position to be a metaphysical one, his invariance relations would be non-local, albeit more local than either 
a modal realist or best-system laws view.  Invariance relations would still depend on what happened 
elsewhere and at other times in this world.
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properties, and their instances are real.31  Cartwright allows for special science ‘laws’ of 
the kind we allow for – the rule of thumb, ceteris paribus generalizations that are 
produced in the special sciences; laws with exceptions that can be explained using a 
mechanism.  But these laws arise out of the reasonably regular reactions of entities with 
similar capacities: the truthmakers for laws are capacities.  She writes: ‘It is not the laws 
which are fundamental, but rather the capacities. … Whatever associations occur in 
nature arise as a consequence of the actions of these more fundamental capacities.’ 
(Cartwright 1989 p181.)
Using capacities in an account of mechanisms allows what a mechanism is to be local. 
For Cartwright, the capacities of the entities in a mechanism are properties of the entities, 
not dependent on anything anywhere else in this world or any other.  This nicely fits 
scientific practice since scientists in many domains spend a lot of time figuring out the 
capacities of the entities in mechanisms underlying the phenomena that are interesting to 
them.  When scientists point to a mechanism and identify it as the mechanism responsible 
for certain phenomena, on this view they are pointing to something real and really there.
Cartwright ensures that her metaphysics is real and local.  An ontology using entities and 
their powers is structurally similar to that of Cartwright.  This approach might also yield 
real and local mechanisms.  See the work of Carl Gillett (2006) and recent as yet 
unpublished work by Stephen Mumford, both using an active powers metaphysics in their 
approach to mechanisms.32  Machamer, Darden and Craver are also trying to use an 
active approach as a good metaphysics for mechanisms, but the view remains as yet 
under-developed.  We think it an interesting view worthy of the necessary development.33
These views are promising approaches to mechanisms, but note that not all active 
metaphysical approaches will do.  Dispositional approaches are structurally similar to 
Cartwright’s capacities approach and the powers approach, having a basic ontology of 
entities plus their dispositional properties, rather than entities and their capacities or 
powers.  But the further detail of most dispositional approaches would create problems. 
First, many accounts of what dispositions are, are non-local.  This would apply to either 
conditional or law-based accounts of dispositions.  Second, the local approach to 
characterising dispositions is the one which claims that dispositions are intrinsic 
properties of objects.  This makes it an acceptable approach to those wanting a real and 
local metaphysics and willing to accept metaphysical claims about intrinsic properties, 
but we are not inclined to accept them.  All science needs is clusters of capacities that 
31 Cartwright argues this extensively.  See her 1989.  She also argues against the possibility of describing 
away capacities in terms of regularities.  She writes: ‘One does not just say the acid and the base interact 
because they behave differently together from the way they behave separately; rather, we understand 
already a good deal about how the separate capacities work and why they should interfere with each other 
in just the way they do.’ (Cartwright 1989 p165.)
32 One might hold that powers are a better prospect for the metaphysics of mechanisms than dispositions, 
since dispositions can be seen as structural properties of static objects, whereas powers are more dynamic. 
On this point, see also Machamer 2004.  See Illari and Williamson (forthcoming a) for further discussion of 
the dynamic nature of activities.
33 We argue elsewhere that Machamer, Darden and Craver’s activities-entities dualism compares well to 
Cartwright’s entities-capacities ontology, on various criteria for ontology.  See Illari and Williamson 
forthcoming a.
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stick around together for long enough and produce a phenomenon regularly enough for us 
to get interested in it and look for the mechanism.  As Cartwright says of capacities: 
‘They do indeed endure; on the other hand, their characteristics may evolve naturally 
through time, and they may be changed in systematic, even predictable, ways as a 
consequence of other factors in nature with which they interact.’ (1989 p157.)
 
In conclusion, those wishing for a local and real metaphysics of mechanisms should not 
use counterfactual notions grounded in laws or other possible worlds in their 
characterization of mechanisms.  There are alternative available metaphysics, along the 
capacities or active powers lines, which are real and local.  These aspects of the 
capacities or active powers metaphysics are well-known in the core metaphysics 
literature, of course, but their existence seems to have been largely ignored in the 
mechanisms literature.
6 Objections: laws, capacities and fundamental explainers
In this section we introduce two major objections to our line of argument.  The first 
objection claims that capacities or powers cannot explain anything at all.  We argue that 
they can, and do a job more suited to the special sciences use of mechanisms than laws or 
counterfactuals.  The second objection is an argument attempting to show that on laws or 
counterfactuals-based stories, mechanisms can still be local.  We argue that whether this 
succeeds depends on precisely what you are claiming in characterising mechanisms.  On 
one of the cases we identify, there is no serious disagreement, on the other account we 
argue that mechanisms remain non-local.
6a Capacities cannot explain
Recall that the major reason for introducing mechanisms is to explain.  The most 
uncontroversial claim about mechanisms is that they explain, whether in a physical or in 
an epistemic way.  It might be objected to our arguments that positing an active 
metaphysics such as capacities or powers as explainers, particularly as fundamental 
explainers, is illegitimate, because capacities and powers do not explain anything.  To say 
A produced B because it has a capacity or power to produce B, or engaged in the activity 
which brings about B, explains nothing – it might be thought a mere assertion of 
‘dormitive virtue’.
The first thing to notice in this debate between capacities or powers, and laws or 
counterfactuals, is that a parallel complaint can be made about laws or counterfactuals. 
To say that A produced B because there is a law that A produces B might also be thought 
to explain nothing.  The only ‘explanation’ offered by a law is the recognition that things 
just tend to happen that way, that things like A tend to produce things like B.  Intuitions 
on whether to prefer something like capacities or something like laws as fundamental 
explainers do seem to vary.
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There is something odd in considering a law or a capacity, alone, as a complete 
explanation.  The explanations we do get tell us so much more.  Consider the explanation 
of how the cell produces proteins.  Neither the claim that it has a capacity to do so, nor 
the claim that cells like it also produce proteins, tell us much.  Mechanisms explain in 
terms of lower-level entities and their capacities, powers, activities or some such item of 
an active metaphysics.  Mechanisms as a whole are neither just capacities, nor just laws. 
Mechanistic explanation generally starts with a regularity: the identification of a 
phenomenon requiring explanation – usually a regularly occurring phenomenon.  In the 
case of protein synthesis, distinguishing between kinds of proteins produced, and so 
further dividing the explanandum phenomenon is important.  Mechanistic explanation 
then proceeds by identifying the parts that make up the phenomenon – the production of 
each protein, and what those parts do, and can do under similar circumstances.  To see 
this as the identification of the entities present, and the capacities or powers that those 
entities have, seems natural.  Lawlike regularities can be useful in describing 
mechanisms, but as we have explained, this is consistent with an active metaphysics 
account of mechanisms.  On this views lawlike regularities are not fundamental.  For 
those influenced by the widespread concern of those in the mechanisms literature that 
there are no special science laws, which we identified as a key reason for turning to 
consideration of mechanisms, this mechanistic view of explanation is far superior.
6b Mechanisms using laws or counterfactuals can still be local
There may be a deeper objection to our argument that using passive grounds for 
counterfactual notions to characterize mechanisms renders them non-local.  This is as 
follows: the status of mechanisms as mechanisms depends only on the natural properties 
that the mechanisms have.  Although these natural properties depend on the laws of 
nature, or other possible worlds, nevertheless the natural properties are local.  Thus, the 
mechanisms themselves are local.  The broad idea seems to be to push the underlying 
non-local metaphysics into the background, and insist that in general, say, protein 
synthesis depends only on the natural properties of the molecules in the cell, while 
natural selection depends only on the natural properties in the population and its local 
environment.  This, the claim would go, yields the required locality in spite of the fact 
that these natural properties only produce anything or interact with anything in virtue of 
things widely spread in time and space.  Thus mechanisms are constitutively local since 
what makes a mechanism a mechanism is these natural properties, the laws being merely 
some kind of inert background conditions.
This is an interesting possibility, which raises the issue of what a characterization of 
mechanisms is intended to do.  Over the course of this paper we have identified a number 
of differences in approaches to mechanisms.  A genuine possibility here is that some in 
the debate are not concerned to make any claims about the nature of mechanisms – that 
is, no claims that really impinge on the metaphysics of mechanisms.34  This might be a 
way to defend Woodward, Psillos and Glennan.  Perhaps they are merely trying to give 
an account of mechanisms that will let you pick them out, so that you can discriminate 
34 This might be partially due to their primary concern being with epistemic explanation.
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mechanisms from non-mechanisms – rather than illuminate what they actually are. 
Perhaps the best characterisation uses counterfactuals or invariance relations because they 
best let you pick out the mechanisms.
It is possible to read both Woodward and Glennan as merely characterizing how you pick 
out mechanisms.  Woodward’s paper is titled, ‘What is a mechanism?  A counterfactual 
account,’ but his abstract summarizing his argument is less clear.  He writes: ‘This paper 
presents a counterfactual account of what a mechanism is. Mechanisms consist of parts, 
the behavior of which conforms to generalizations that are invariant under interventions, 
and which are modular in the sense that it is possible in principle to change the behavior 
of one part independently of the others. Each of these features can be captured by the 
truth of certain counterfactuals.’  (Woodward 2002 S366, emphasis added.)  Perhaps he is 
only claiming something about what the parts of mechanisms typically do, not what they 
are.  Glennan is also open to this interpretation.  He writes: ‘ “Interaction” is a causal 
notion that must be understood in terms of the truth of certain counterfactuals. The 
stipulation that these interactions can be characterized by invariant, change-relating 
generalizations is meant to capture the relevant counterfactual truth claims.’ (Glennan 
2002 S344, emphasis added.)  If you read ‘must be understood in terms of’ fairly lightly, 
this may not be a claim about a deeper metaphysics.
If this is indeed the aim Woodward, Psillos and Glennan have in mind, then their 
accounts would fit that aim.  Mechanisms do typically exhibit a stability which can very 
naturally be characterised using various counterfactual notions.  If this is the claim then it 
is perfectly legitimate to say that a counterfactual characterization using a laws or modal 
realist grounding for counterfactuals is compatible with a local deeper metaphysics.  A 
characterization of this sort says nothing about metaphysics.  When serious questions 
about the nature of mechanisms arise, the non-local metaphysics used merely to pick out 
mechanisms can fade quietly into the background.
That is one possibility.  However, it seems that Woodward, Psillos and Glennan all have 
at least some intention of arguing for a claim about the nature of mechanisms.  In some 
form or other, they all argue that some counterfactual notion is essential or ineliminable 
in characterising mechanisms.  This might well be taken as a stronger claim about the 
nature of mechanisms, beyond any claim about a handy way to pick them out.  The 
quotes from Woodward and Glennan above are certainly open to this stronger reading. 
Psillos must be read in this stronger way.35  He argues extensively that counterfactuals are 
indispensable to a characterization of mechanisms, repeating this kind of claim at several 
points in his paper.  He summarizes the thesis he has argued for towards the end of the 
paper: ‘mechanisms need counterfactuals; but counterfactuals do not need mechanisms. 
In other words, mechanistic causation requires counterfactual dependence but not 
conversely. It is in this sense, that the counterfactual approach is more basic than the 
mechanistic.’ (Psillos 2004 p315.)  To claim that the counterfactual approach is more 
basic than the mechanistic does look like a metaphysical claim in this paper.
35 Note that Psillos could defend himself by retreating into a general anti-realism.  But then we think his 
general anti-realist views will support his views on mechanisms, not vice versa.
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If the claims of any of the three are claims about the basic – ineliminably basic – 
metaphysics for mechanisms, then it is a claim about the nature of mechanisms.  It is not 
clear how such a claim can fade into the background to allow mechanisms to be 
considered constitutively local.  It is claimed that the nature of mechanisms is to have the 
natural properties that they do lead to the interactions that they do only in virtue of the 
laws of nature, or facts about other possible worlds.  But then what mechanisms are is 
non-local.  Depending on the detail of the further claims, mechanisms might also turn out 
to be non-real.
Another thought is that Psillos, Woodward and Glennan are in various ways concerned 
with understanding causation, as well as mechanisms.  Perhaps the claim that a non-local 
metaphysics doesn’t make causal claims non-local is plausible in a way that the parallel 
claim for mechanisms is not.  In considering causal claims, we immediately focus on 
salient causes, and standardly assume vast amounts of stable background conditions. 
Perhaps in this context the claim that natural properties are local, treating a passive 
metaphysics as background, is not unreasonable.  But in the context of physical 
mechanistic explanation – not epistemic mechanistic explanation – we are not in the same 
situation.  For mechanisms, the entire structural background is crucial to what a 
mechanism is.  On this metaphysical view, such mechanisms are non-local.
Perhaps the objection discussed in this section could be read as intending merely to 
deflect the counterintuitiveness of mechanistic explanation turning out to be non-local.36 
If this is so, it seems to fail.  Non-local mechanistic explanations of this sort are 
committed to the core claim that the behaviour of other people like me in this world, or 
my counterparts in other possible worlds, is in some way relevant to explaining why I 
bump into lampposts.  This is precisely the counterintuitive claim that we deny.  A 
mechanistic explanation of my clumsiness depends only on facts about me.  There is a 
metaphysics available without such a counterintuitive consequence – a metaphysics of 
capacities, powers or activities, which should be preferred.
In conclusion, capacities can explain and mechanisms are still non-local on any claim that 
counterfactual notions are part of their nature, their metaphysics.  The active metaphysics 
of capacities or powers clearly comes out better, thoroughly satisfying both locality and 
reality.
7 Conclusion
We have argued extensively that both scientific practice and much of the mechanisms 
literature is committed to mechanisms being both real and local.  We further argued that 
if mechanisms are to be real and local, so that they can be used in physical explanations 
of phenomena, in a form distinct from laws-based explanation, they require an active 
metaphysics such as Cartwright’s capacities approach, a powers approach, or an activities 
approach.
36 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility.
21
We have framed all our arguments here about mechanistic explanation.  We believe that 
exploring mechanistic explanation will be illuminating to metaphysical debates about 
causation, but not necessarily in a simple way, meaning that it is best to understand 
mechanistic explanation thoroughly, and then go on explicitly to consider its relation to 
causation and causal explanation.  For those interested in scientific methodology more 
than metaphysical debates, it is probably sufficient to note that scientists involved in 
mechanistic explanation of the sort we describe see themselves as straightforwardly 
involved in causal explanation.  See for example the work of an evolutionary biologist: 
‘The main purpose of evolutionary biology is to provide a rational explanation for the 
extraordinarily complex and intricate organization of living things.  To explain means to  
identify a mechanism that causes evolution and to demonstrate the consequences of its  
operation.’ (Bell 1997 p1, emphasis added.)  Or consider the view of a biochemist: 
‘Uncovering the cellular mechanisms resulting in sequential transfer of information from 
DNA (our genes) to RNA and then to protein represents one of major achievements of 
biochemistry in the 20th century.’  (Whitford 2005 p247, emphasis added.)  Both clearly 
see themselves as investigating causes.  From this point of view, all our arguments apply 
straightforwardly to this important variety of causal explanation.
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